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Abstract 
This paper investigates the average gross per capita income convergence of eight 
Southeast European economies towards the EU average. Our goal is to analyse 
which factors have driven that convergence in the SEE region and describe 
convergence paths in the 2000-2018 period, concerning two sub-periods, before 
and after the economic crisis. We use a combination of parametric and 
nonparametric methods and a fixed effects linear panel regression with robust 
standard errors. Results suggest that the EU integration process drove 
convergence, education level, investment (FDI, private domestic and public 
investments), and private sector lending, as well as by government expenditures. 
Economic crisis, unemployment, and inflation were the main factors which have 
influenced the divergence process. We also concluded that the post-transition 
growth model dominant in the SEE region, based on an FDI inflow, has not 
sufficient for income convergence in this region. Private domestic investments are 
a critical missing factor for faster income convergence.
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1. Introduction
Southeast Europe (SEE)5 entered the 21st century as one of the most underdeveloped 
parts of Europe, with an average gross domestic product (GDP) per capita almost 
ten times lower than the European Union (EU) average. A deep recession in 
the early 1990s influenced by the wars in the former Yugoslavia, international 
sanctions, delay in structural reforms, political instability, lack of investment, and 
many other factors, negatively affected the economic development of the region at 
the beginning of the transition process (Bartlett, 2009; Uvalic, 2010).
The region has been recovering since 2000. Some of the reasons for the relatively 
high growth rates during the 2000-2008 period were the low starting position, 
significant donor assistance (primarily from the EU), and significant FDI inflow 
due to the stabilization of the political environment (except for North Macedonia, 
which was affected by the conflict in 2001). FDI has steadily increased, particularly 
after 2006, including some significant privatization deals in the telecommunications 
and banking sector across the region (Uvalic, 2010: 11). Simultaneously, close 
to €7 billion of international assistance, both in the form of grants and loans, 
entered SEE countries in the 2001-2002 period (European Commission, 2003: 
5). However, not all countries had the same pace of development, nor did they 
rebuild their economies with the same success. Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia, for 
example, have become part of the EU, which has greatly affected their economic 
development. Despite the significant growth in the previous period, the SEE region 
is still the least developed region in Europe. That implies that the convergence 
process was slow and inadequate, which is a starting point for our analysis. 
The main goal of this paper is to examine the process of the income convergence 
between SEE and the EU during the 2000-2018 period. The main hypothesis is that 
income convergence in SEE countries was slow and inadequate during that period. 
We will also test the logical assumption that the dynamics of income convergence 
is faster in the period before the economic crisis and slower in the period after the 
crisis. The purpose of this paper is also to examine the gross income convergence 
and divergence factors in the case of the analysed SEE economies. We use gross 
income as a convergence indicator (although GDP per capita is more predominantly 
used) because we focus on living standards rather than just on economic growth. 
At the same time, GDP per capita might substantially decrease or increase within 
a decade due to migrations or demographic trends without any effects on the 
convergence of citizens’ living standard. Finally, GDP per capita provides data on 
the productivity of the economy and does not provide enough information on the 
living standard. Therefore, it is possible that GDP per capita steadily grows and 
5 In our analysis we use the IMF and WB definition of SEE which includes Albania, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania and Serbia.
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converges and that gross income remains unchanged in case large proportions of 
gross added value is not reinvested or spent in the country.
After a detailed literature review in part two, we explain the research methodology 
and define the model and variables in part three. Empirical data and analysis 
are presented in the fourth section, including Kernel distribution dynamics and 
regression results. We use a combination of parametric and nonparametric methods 
to study the dynamics of real per-capita income for eighth SEE countries relative 
to the EU average over the period 2000-2018. First, we estimated the probability 
density function of per capita income using a kernel estimator and analysed the 
evolution in their shape to follow convergence tendencies in the SEE countries. 
Second, using regression analysis we identified the various factors that contribute to 
or reduce convergence over the selected period. A discussion of the results is given 
in part five, followed with conclusions in part six.
2. Literature review
Gross income convergence has been investigated far less in economic literature 
than the GDP convergence. The rationale relies on the theoretical concepts that 
higher GDP growth rates in less developed countries will lead to higher income, 
and therefore, income convergence will follow economic convergence. Theoretical 
aspects of growth convergence (Rassekh et al., 2001; Ben-David, 1996; Greasley 
and Oxley, 1997) provided essential insights into the structure of the convergence 
process. Growth convergence among regions inside a country and a specific group 
of countries have also been studied (Linden, 2002; Carlino and Mills, 1996; 
Zhang et al., 2001; Dobson and Ramlogan, 2002). The analysis of the economic 
convergence of the U.S. states between 1840 and 1988 proved the existence of 
β-convergence – economies further below steady-state position grow faster (Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin, 1990). Most research papers analysed and measured convergence 
by using beta and sigma convergence across countries. Beta convergence implies 
catching up while sigma convergence implies a reduction in disparities (Grela et 
al. 2017). Beta convergence generates sigma convergence and is a necessary, but 
not sufficient, condition of sigma convergence. Countries cannot become similar in 
terms of GDP if poorer ones do not grow faster (Grela et al. 2017). Apart from beta 
and sigma convergence, literature recognized nominal and real convergence where 
nominal convergence represents higher uniformity of nominal variables, while real 
convergence refers to an approximation of economy welfare levels proxied by GDP 
per capita (Martin et al., 2001: 3). 
In the EU, regional linkages have a significant role in the formation of 
convergence clubs (Borsi and Metiu, 2015). Assessment of 102 EU regions 
over the period 1995–2000 (Tselios, 2009) proved the presence of conditional 
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convergence in income per capita after controlling for educational attainment, 
unemployment, sectoral composition, spatially lagged growth of income per 
capita, and regional fixed effects, and that of unconditional convergence in income 
inequality. The effects of the European integration on regional convergence of 188 
regions between 1991 and 2004 have been thoroughly assessed, and conclusions 
on growth convergence were not unambiguous (De Dominicis, 2014). Research 
on the existence of convergence of 10 European countries, which accessed the 
European Union in 2004 (Vojinovic et al. 2009), provided clear conclusions that 
convergence took place during the examined period 1995-2006. On the other 
hand, Simionescu (2015: 74) reject the hypothesis of overall convergence in EU-
28 over 1995-2012. There is also a study showing that economic, socio-political, 
and policy differences among EU member states reduce the rate of convergence 
in the EU (Yin et al., 2003: 210). In some countries, growth rates are varying 
among regions. According to Eckey and Türck (2005: 18) most studies find a low 
convergence rate of all or some European regions. The result of EU-25 regional 
income analyses shows regional disparities in both EU-15 and new member 
states (Paas and Schlitte, 2006: 23). In Croatia, for example, there is a lack of 
regional convergence and regions with a higher level of public investments had 
higher growth rates and short and long-term increases in wages and employment 
(Drezgić, 2011: 55). 
Discussion so far draws that there is little empirical reason for the uncertainty that 
European integration would cause economies to diverge, and real convergence 
would seem to depend on a country’s capacity to international technological 
spillovers mainly through FDIs (Martin et al., 2001: 1). Therefore, an important 
group of convergence factors includes the relevance and impact of FDI and trade 
and financial openness. The level and growth of per capita income did converge 
as bilateral FDI flow increased between the two countries. This implies that FDI 
flow is critical in human capital spillover and thus convergence (Choi, 2004). In 
the case of 8 CEE countries (Kutan and Yigit, 2009: 136), technology transfer 
facilitates catching up by this group of countries towards EU15 productivity. 
Scholars also state the dependence of new member states’ convergence speed and 
speed of capital accumulation (Alho et al., 2004: 19). In the case of 35 OECD 
countries (D’Elia and De Santis, 2019), low- and middle-income countries benefit 
more from international trade and trade and financial openness. They further 
reduce the growth gaps across the countries, but not income inequality. There is 
also a statement that greater financial integration leading to the transfer of capital 
from rich to poor, but with higher incomes, financial integration plays fewer roles 
in attracting foreign capital and reducing this growth impulse (Abiad et al., 2007: 
26).
Simionescu (2015: 68) pointed out that convergence is an important problem 
for new EU member states. Niebhur and Schlitte (2004: 175) also state that 
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convergence speed has declined since the early period of European integration 
… and catching up to the EU average will be a long-term process for the new 
member states. Important findings on the economic cycles impact on the Eurozone 
inequality dynamics show country-level differentiability regarding the utilisation 
of cyclical advantages (Rubinic and Tajnikar, 2020) which creates serious adverse 
effects on inequality due to the unequal exchange of labour in the Eurozone 
(Rubinic and Tajnikar, 2019). The focus on the WB region shows that the absolute 
convergence of the WB countries was much stronger up to 2008 due to lower 
initial growth at the earlier stage of transition and global economic expansion 
before the crisis (Krestovska, 2018: 198). In general, the WB region converges 
to the EU, but real convergence to the EU average is relatively slow (Krestovska, 
2018: 200). According to Sanfey and Milatovic (2018: 2) the WB region will need 
decades to catch up with EU average standards of living, and full convergence 
will require productivity and investment on a higher level. According to this 
report, productivity is a fundamental problem of WB region, reflected in under-
investments, undeveloped institutions and the business environment (Sanfey and 
Milatovic, 2018: 2). Starting with the literature review, our analysis is focused on 
income convergence, while most of the published literature on the issue is based on 
GDP per capita convergence. We believe that this innovative approach, rarely used 
in economic literature in the region, will put a new light on key factors influencing 
living standard in the SEE. Second, we will not use standard first (β-convergence) 
and second (σ-convergence) moments of the income distribution, which fail to 
characterize the evolution of the entire income distribution over time. Because of 
the heterogeneity across SEE countries, we will implement a methodology that 
uses kernel density estimates to examine the shape of the income distribution and 
distributional dynamics (Nenovsky and Tochkov, 2014). Last but not least, we want 
to explore one of the main expectations in transition economies that the process 
of EU integration leads to an increase in the living standard and catching up with 
income per capita in the EU. 
3. Methodology
In order to analyse what are the long-run tendencies of incomes, we will start from 
Quah (1993, 1996a, 1996b and 1997). The nonparametric part of the analysis starts 
with estimating the probability density function of relative per capita income using 
a kernel function. Let X1,…, Xn be a sample of n identically distributed observations 
on a random variable X. The density value f(x) at a given point x is estimated by the 
following kernel density estimator
∑
 (1)
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where h denotes the bandwidth of the interval around x and K is the kernel 
function.6 (Li and Racine, 2007). The kernel estimator assigns a weight to each 
observation in the interval around x, with the weight being inversely proportional 
to the distance between the observation and x. The density estimate consists of the 
vertical sum of frequencies at each observation. The resulting smooth curve allows 
us to visualize the shape of the distribution of relative per-capita income and detect 
the presence of “convergence clubs” represented by modes.
Second, we attempt to identify the determinants of relative per capita income 
growth via regression analysis. For this purpose, we estimate the following model:
1 2 3 + 
+ 
+ 
                                    
  
(2)
The dependent variable is the adjusted gross disposable income of households per 
capita SEE country i (i=1,…,8) in year t as a percentage of the EU average. For 
robustness purposes and to control for short-run fluctuations, we also estimate the 
model for average gross disposable income over 3-year periods as the dependent 
variable. The regression employs country-fixed effects (αi) to control for the 
effects of unobserved confounding variables that vary across countries and years. 
Regressors in the model are chosen based on the standard growth literature. (Sala-
i-Martin, 1997; Durlauf and Quah, 1999; Temple, 1999). Our dependent variable 
measures income convergence per capita towards the EU benchmark over time. 
As independent variables, we used different factors which can increase or 
decrease the rate of convergence. Human capital is represented by average years 
of total schooling (SCH) for individuals aged 15 years and above (see, i.e. Barro 
and Lee, 2013) and unemployment level (UNEMPL). We suppose thet SCH 
positively influences income convergence, while it is opposite for unemployment. 
Fiscal policy is approximated by government expenditures as the percentage of 
GDP (GOVEXP) and public debt (DEBT). We believe that GOVEXP stimulates 
income convergence, while public debt generates income divergence. External 
forces are represented by the level of foreign trade (FTR), calculated as the sum 
of exports and imports, and by net inflow of the foreign direct investment (FDI). 
Investments are separated into public (INVG) and domestic private investments 
6 We use data-driven bandwidth selection and an Epanechnikov kernel function.
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(INVD). We assume that investments and FTR are influencing positively income 
convergence. Monetary policy is approximated by price instability and measured 
as the annual rate of the consumer prices index (CPI), and we expect that impact 
on income convergence is negative. The financial sector and financial depending 
are approximated by the level of credits to the private sector (LOAN), which can 
positively influence income convergence. All investments and credits, as well as 
fiscal variables and foreign trade, are expressed as a percentage of GDP. 
Finally, we include dummy variables for the years in which a SEE country 
was a member of the EU (EU) and for the years of the global crises (CRIS). 
Membership in the EU takes the value of 1 if a SEE country is an EU member 
in that year, and 0 otherwise. The “years of the global crises” takes the value 
of 1 during the 2009-2010 period and 0 otherwise. Finally, we included lagged 
values of the dependent variable in order to conclude about the persistency of the 
convergence process. 
4. Empirical data and analysis
The sample covers eight countries in SEE during the period 2000-2018. The 
adjusted gross disposable income of households per capita reflects the purchasing 
power of households and their ability to invest in goods and services or save for 
the future. It is calculated as the adjusted gross disposable income of households 
divided by the purchasing power parities (PPP) of the actual individual consumption 
of households and by the total resident population. The index is calculated with 
the European Union average set to equal 100. If the index of a country is higher 
than 100, this country’s level of adjusted gross disposable income of households 
per person is higher than the EU average and vice versa. Variables were collected 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database and Eurostat.7 Data 
sets are analysed using STATA software. The descriptive statistics for all variables 
are shown in Table 1.
7 Source for dependent variable is EUROSTAT, online data code SDG_10_20.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics8
2000-2018 2000-2008 2009-2018
Average income per capita  
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Source: Author’s calculation according to data obtained from WB and Eurostat
The average per-capita income in SEE was 37% of the EU average. Five 
variables – unemployment rate, FDI, public investment, inflation and government 
expenditures – decreased between the first and second sample periods. The 
average gross income in SEE was in the period 2000-2008 around 10 percentage 
points lower than in the second period. Parallel to that, the unemployment rate 
was lower, as well as the level of foreign trade. The price liberalization caused 
relatively high levels of inflation in the 2000s during that phase of transition in 
SEE. Moderate public spending in the second period (government expenditures 
and public investment), lower foreign direct investments, and a higher level of 
public debt was most probably the result of the global financial crisis in Europe in 
the 2009-2010 period. 
8 The reported numbers are averages across all countries and years. Standard deviations are in 
parenthesis.
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To choose a regression technique, we first tested autocorrelation in panel data 
using the Wooldridge test (Wooldridge, 2002). Results show that first-order 
autocorrelation is present (Prob>F=0.002 for 2000-2018 period; Prob>F=0.010 
for 2000-2008 period; Prob>F=0.0014 for 2009-2018 period;). Modified Wald 
test for groupwise heteroskedasticity in fixed effects (FE) regression model shows 
that heteroskedasticity is present for all dependent variables. Finally, taking into 
consideration that in our panel, N is bigger than T (N=1,216; T=10), we tested 
cross-sectional dependence using the test of Pesaran (2004). Results show no 
presence of cross-sectional dependence in our panel.
Table 2: Heteroskedasticity tests results
Variables Modified Wild Test
Average income per capita (% of EU average), 2000-2018 1,594.16(0.000)
Average income per capita (% of EU average), 2000-2008 85.16(0.000)
Average income per capita (% of EU average), 2009-2018 283.98(0.000)
Source: Author’s calculation according to data obtained from WB and Eurostat
Recent literature dealing with the estimation of heterogeneous panels (Baltagi 
et al., 2006; Baltagi et al., 2010) suggests that, if heteroskedasticity is present, 
the choice of a relevant model is sensitive to specifying the correct source of 
heteroskedasticity. Starting from that, and also taking into consideration that first-
order autocorrelation is present, based on the conclusions of Hoechle (2007), we 
will use in our analysis fixed effects linear panel regression with robust standard 
error.9 
4.1. Distribution dynamics
The density distributions of average gross income per capita as % of the EU 
average for the pre-crisis period (years 2000, 2004 and 2008) are presented in 
Figure 1. At the start of the observed period in 2000, the density distribution was 
almost unimodal, with most of the probability mass concentrated in the range 
between 20% and 30% of the EU average, with a minor mode emerging at the 50% 
level. Over the following eight years, there is a clear shift of the distribution to the 
9 It is also possible to use FGLS regression, but that method is infeasible if the panel’s time 
dimension T is smaller than its cross-sectional dimension N (Hoechle, 2007), which it is in 
our case.
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right, signifying convergence to the benchmark. Also, an increase in the dispersion 
of average income per capita produces a new range at around 30-45% of the EU 
average. Simultaneously, a minor mode emerges at the 60% level suggesting some 
level of convergence between SEE countries. 
Figure 1: Kernel density distributions of average gross income per capita (% of EU 
average), 2000-2008
Source: Author’s calculation according to data obtained from WB and Eurostat
The observed convergence over the first decade of the 2000s correlates with the 
most dynamic period of the transition in SEE, when many economies in the region 
experienced high growth rates and significant investments, especially FDIs. The 
strong convergence tendency of the late 2000s reflects the success of political 
reforms in generating growth that allowed SEE countries to catch up with the EU. 
At the end of this period, two countries (Romania and Bulgaria) became members 
of the EU. 
The distributional dynamics in the period after 2009 present a slightly different 
picture. The density distributions of average gross income per capita as % of the 
EU average for the crisis and post-crisis period (years 2009, 2013 and 2018) are 
presented in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Kernel density distributions of average gross income per capita (% of EU 
average), 2009-2018
Source: Author’s calculation according to data obtained from WB and Eurostat
This period started with an economic crisis that heated the whole of Europe. A 
continuous shift of the distribution to the right, started in the previous period, was 
slowed, discontinuing the convergence between SEE and the EU benchmark. In the 
next five years, distribution remains similar, between 30-45% of the EU benchmark. 
In the last five years of the observed period, we can see significant convergence 
again. In that period, distribution was shifted to the right again, with most of the 
probability mass concentrated around 40% of the EU average. At the same time, we 
see some modes around 50%, and minor modes around 60%. These include mostly 
EU member countries in the SEE, such as Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia, as well 
as Montenegro. Although they experienced an increase in income per capita, the 
speed of convergence was moderate compared to the first period when most of 
the SEE countries doubled average gross income per capita measured in % of EU 
average. For instance, in the first observed period, countries like Bulgaria achieved 
a 55% increase in its relative standing while Montenegro reached a 62% increase. 
Also, not all countries experienced the same dynamics in the second period. Serbia 
recorded a 2.6% increase in its relative standing over the period 2009-2018, better 
than Croatia (1.6%) similar with Bosnia-Herzegovina (3.3%), but far behind North 
Macedonia (11.8%), Albania (14.8%), Bulgaria (16.3%), Montenegro (17.5%) or 
Romania (23.1%). 
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4.2. Regression results
Regression analysis results are in line with the previous findings. The results for 
model specification of the fixed-effects over the entire sample period and two sub-
periods are shown in Table 3. We should note again that the dependent variable 
measures income convergence (or divergence) between SEE and the EU over time. 
Table 3: Regression results for average gross income per capita GDP in % of EU 
average
2000-2018 2000-2008 2009-2018





































































































No of Observation 141 62 79
* 5% significance level; ** 10% significance level
Source: Author’s calculation according to data obtained from WB and Eurostat
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5. Results and discussion
The regression analysis shows that progress in EU integration, education (average 
years of schooling) and investments (FDI and public investment) were the key 
determinants of convergence over the entire sample period while divergence was 
mainly driven by the economic crisis and by the unemployment rate growth after 
the economic crisis 2009-2010. 
Membership in the EU contributes to the accelerated economic growth and faster 
convergence (Ryszard and Mariusz, 2019; Alcidi, 2019; Cuaresma et al., 2008). In 
the case of SEE countries, that is most evident for Romania, Bulgaria, and Croatia. 
At the same time, average years of schooling promotes not only economic growth 
but also convergence towards the EU average per capita income (Henderson 
and Russell, 2005). Based on the comparative analysis of the education quality 
significance to economic growth (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2010) it is logical 
to assume that the education quality has improved alongside increased years 
of schooling in SEE. The educated workforce helped SEE to grow more rapidly 
than the EU benchmark. Many factors might be responsible for this, including the 
historical quality of education in SEE as well as enhanced opportunities for higher 
income in the booming private sector (2001-2008) in comparison to the salaries 
in the public sector. However, this effect seems to be limited to the first period of 
transition, while in the second period, with higher levels of development, some 
other factors become more important. That is also influenced by the massive brain 
drain from SEE, especially in the period after the crisis.
The impact of FDI on convergence in the whole observed period is positive. 
In economic literature, there is a clear consensus that FDI contributes to living 
standards (OECD, 2008). Hence, some analysis shows that the result depends 
“positively on levels of freedom from government intervention and freedom 
from business regulation, and negatively on FDI volatility and natural resource 
dependence” (Herzer, 2012). We assume that FDI flow in the SEE region is mostly 
driven by a cheap labour force, while markets are unstable and highly dependent on 
government intervention. In such an environment, FDI contributes to the average 
income growth, but much less than expected. At the same time, the contribution of 
private domestic investment is significant, especially in the second period. Most of 
the literature points out this factor as critical for growth and convergence toward 
the EU standard (Grela et al., 2017).
A positive sign for the coefficient of financial depending (LOAN) is not unexpected, 
taking in consideration previous studies for this region (Kiss et al. 2006; Stojanović 
and Stojanović, 2015). Between 2000 and 2008, most of the SEE countries 
experienced an unprecedented credit boom with double-digit increases in private 
lending as a share of GDP. Credit growth was fuelled by large inflows resulting 
from the high liquidity on global markets that was channelled into SEE via foreign-
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owned banks that dominate the financial sector in many countries in the region 
(IMF, 2015; IMF, 2017). Presence of foreign banks made it possible to increase 
the availability of funds to the private sector in these countries. The credit boom 
disappeared as soon as the global crisis hit the region in 2009-2010. SEE countries, 
which had experienced massive private credit growth in the years 2000-2008, in the 
second period faced a drop or a slowdown in the convergence of their per-capita 
income compared to the EU average.
In the period after the crisis, most of the countries established expansive fiscal 
policies to fasten economic growth and fight economic crisis. On the other side, 
significant level of government expenditures is followed by high public debt. 
Although the literature on the relationship between government debt and economic 
growth in the period of crisis and after crisis (Darvas, 2010; Checherita-Westphal 
and Rother, 2011), shows a certain positive correlation between fiscal expenditures, 
public debt, and growth, that is true until a certain threshold is reached. All 
countries (except Bulgaria) experience high levels of public debt, which hampered 
the income convergence of the region. 
Our results also show that the global economic crisis has slowed down the 
convergence of the SEE region. That result is in line with economic literature 
(Matkowski et al. 2016; Stanisic, 2012). During the crisis, most of the convergence 
drivers (investments, EU integration process, credit to the private sector) 
dramatically slowed, creating increased income differences between SEE and EU 
countries. Moreover, the scope and duration of this effect have affected the medium-
term convergence path, as we can see from the results in the second period (Table 
3). Although the temporary nature of the crises is evident, this conclusion is in line 
with our finding in the nonparametric part of the analysis that showed convergence 
to be generally affected by the crises. 
At the same time, unemployment played an important role in income divergence 
in the SEE region over time as well as inflation. In particular, increases in inflation 
cause average per capita income in SEE to diverge from the EU average. Inflation 
is more generally a sign of macroeconomic instability, especially in SEE, where 
hyperinflation has resulted from price liberalisation in the early stages of the 
first period as well as from banking and financial crises due to the expansionary 
monetary policy. Therefore, it is not unexpected that this instability hampers the 
reduction of disparities between SEE and the EU.
The results indicate faster income convergence to the EU average in the early years 
of transition (2000-2008). During this period, SEE countries, on average, doubled 
their average per-capita income comparing the benchmark. Some countries, like 
Romania and Bulgaria, entered the EU at the end of this period, which highly 
influenced their income level. Simultaneously, the relative income distribution over 
this period evolved from a multimodal to a unimodal one, hiding a disparity among 
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the countries in the sample. Over the years 2009-2010, SEE countries experienced 
economic crises, which slowed down the convergence. Our analysis shows that in 
the 2009-2018 period, SEE countries did not retrieve convergence dynamics from 
the previous period. At the same time, the global crises influenced convergence 
tendencies but also increased relative income heterogeneity across the region, 
especially between EU and non-EU countries. 
6. Conclusions 
Our analysis shows that income convergence in SEE countries was inadequate 
in the 2000-2018 period. At the same time, over the first eight years (2000-2008), 
there was a clear and dynamic convergence to the EU benchmark. That convergence 
process was interrupted by an economic crisis in 2009, discontinuing the convergence 
between SEE and the EU benchmark after 2010. EU integration has been one of 
the primary goals in SEE over the past two decades and tends to remain the main 
priority in the future. Several countries in the region have succeeded in joining the 
EU (Romania, Bulgaria, and Croatia), while others are candidates and should become 
members in the future. However, SEE countries still rank at the bottom in per capita 
income terms. It seems that the growth model dominant in the SEE region in the 
period before the crisis, based on a large inflow of FDI, has reached its limits. This 
leads us to the SEE countries’ economic policies’ need to focus more on promoting 
domestic private investments as one of the crucial factors for income convergence 
in the coming years. Apart from that, growth and convergence need to be driven by 
other factors affecting structural competitiveness, such as innovation, institutional 
environment and policies, and demographic developments important for the labour 
market outcomes. Finally, to better understand individual countries, analysis of the 
specific countries’ income convergence drivers should be further explored.
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Dohodovna konvergencija Jugoistočne Europe i Europske unije
Goran Radosavljević1, Mihajlo Babin2, Miloš Erić3, Jelisaveta Lazarević4
Sažetak
Ovaj rad analizira prosječnu bruto per capita dohodovnu konvergenciju osam 
zemalja Jugoistočne Evrope (JIE) prema prosjeku EU-a. Cilj je utvrditi koji faktori 
doprinose konvergenciji zemalja JIE regije kao i opisati kretanje konvergencije u 
periodu 2000.-2018. godine, s posebnom pozornošću na dva pod perioda, prije i 
nakon Svjetske ekonomke krize. Koristimo pri tome kombinaciju parametarskih i 
neparametarskih metoda i linearne panel regresije fiksnih efekata s robusnim 
standardnim greškama. Rezultati sugeriraju da je konvergencija bila podstaknuta 
procesom EU integracija, obrazovnim nivoom stanovništva, investicijama 
(stranim, domaćim i javnim), kreditnom ekspanzijom u privatnom sektoru, kao i 
rastom javnih rashoda. S druge strane, ekonomska kriza, nezaposlenost i inflacija 
bili su glavni faktori koji su utjecali na divergenciju procesa. Zaključujemo na 
kraju i da je post-tranzicijski model rasta dominantan u regiji SEE, temeljen na 
stranim direktnim investicijama, nedovoljan, i da su domaće privatne investicije 
kritično-nedostajući faktor brže dohodovne konvergencije. 
Ključne riječi: bruto dohodovna konvergencija, Jugoistočna Europa, ekonomski 
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